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Abstract
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested
in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments
(either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring
part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms:
hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no
rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which together imply individual ratio-
nality) exists. For two agents with separable and responsive preferences, we show
that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for
some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually rational, and
destruction-proof. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency
and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain.
If there are more than two agents, for some profiles of separable preferences, no rule
is efficient, individually rational, and transfer-proof.
JEL Classification: C71, D63, D71.
Keywords: Hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, transfer-proofness, exchange mar-
kets with heterogeneous indivisible objects.
1 Introduction
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible objects where each agent is
endowed with a set of objects. As an example, one may think of markets where people
trade collectibles, for instance stamps, Pockeymon cards, etc.. Other applications (see
also Pa´pai, 2003) are exchanges of equipment or tasks among workers or departments of
a firm or an organization. A well-known special case of our exchange model are so-called
housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) where each agent is endowed with exactly
one object. For housing markets, the so-called top trading rule that assigns the unique
core allocation to each housing market satisfies many appealing properties. In particular,
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the top trading rule is efficient and strategy-proof [no agent ever benefits from misrepre-
senting her preferences] (Roth, 1982). Moreover, it is the only rule satisfying efficiency,
strategy-proofness, and individual rationality [no agent is worse off after trading with
other agents] (Ma, 1994). However, this compatibility result does not extend to “multiple
object” exchange markets (So¨nmez, 1999; Klaus and Miyagawa, 2002). Some recent stud-
ies for exchange markets with indivisibilities and multiple assignment problems without
endowments that consider strategy-proofness in combination with other properties are
Ehlers and Klaus (2003), Klaus and Miyagawa (2002), and Pa´pai (2003, 2004).
We are interested in efficient and individually rational exchange rules. In addition, we
do not want any trader to be able to successfully manipulate the outcome to her advantage
by hiding or destroying part of her endowment or transferring part of it to another trader
who is not worse off because of the transfer.1 We call an exchange rule that is immune to
this type of manipulation hiding-proof, destruction-proof, and transfer-proof, respectively.
In the context of classical exchange economies, Postlewaite (1979) is the first to in-
troduce and study hiding-proofness and destruction-proofness. He shows that, when
preferences are continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly convex, hiding-proofness is
incompatible with efficiency and individual rationality. He also shows that destruction-
proofness is compatible with efficiency and individual rationality.2 For reallocation prob-
lems with single-peaked preferences, Klaus, Peters, and Storcken (1997) consider hiding-
proof rules satisfying various fairness and/or consistency properties. In the context of two-
sided matching with endowments, Sertel and O¨zkal-Sanver (2002) and Fiestras-Janeiro,
Klijn, and Sa´nchez (2004) analyze the manipulability of men- (women-) optimal match-
ing rules via endowments (their non-manipulability by predonation corresponds to our
transfer-proofness condition). Transfer-proofness is also related to the so-called “transfer
paradox” (a trader can be hurt by accepting a predonation). Leontief (1936) is the first
to demonstrate that the Walrasian rule is not immune to the transfer paradox for two-
agent exchange economies. For two-agent economies, transfer-proofness is equivalent to
being immune to the transfer-paradox. Thomson (1987) shows that transfer-proofness is
compatible with efficiency and individual rationality in exchange economies.
We demonstrate that, similarly as in other models, efficient and individually rational
rules are generally not immune to manipulations via endowments (Theorems 1, 2, and 3).
However, we also identify some subclasses of exchange markets where these incompatibil-
ities do not apply: for two agents with separable and responsive preferences, destruction-
proofness is compatible with efficiency and individual rationality (Proposition 1), and for
two agents with unrestricted preferences, efficiency is stronger than transfer-proofness so
that transfer-proofness is compatible with efficiency and individual rationality.3
1Alternatively, we consider myopic transfer-proofness by requiring that the recipient of the transfer
experiences the transfer as weakly endowment improving.
2Thomson (1987) strengthens the former result by showing that the incompatibility persists on the
restricted domain of homothetic preferences even if hiding-proofness is replaced by a weaker notion at which
agents can consume only a positive percentage of what they hide no matter how small that percentage is.
3See also Proposition 2 in the Apendix for the compatibility of myopic transfer-proofness with efficiency
and individual rationality.
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2 The Model
2.1 Exchange Markets with Indivisible Objects
LetK be a set of heterogeneous objects containing at least two objects (we allow |K| =∞).
Let 2K denote the set of all (possibly empty) subsets of K. To simplify notation, we omit
the brackets when denoting subsets of K and write, for instance, xyz instead of {x, y, z}.
Let N ≡ {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents containing at least two agents. Each agent
i ∈ N is endowed with a finite (possibly empty) set of objects Ei ∈ 2K . No two agents own
the same object(s). So, an endowment distribution E ≡ (E1, . . . , En) is defined by (i) for
all i ∈ N , |Ei| <∞, (ii)
⋃n
i=1Ei ∈ 2K , and (iii) for all i, j ∈ N , Ei∩Ej = ∅ if i 6= j. Note
that
⋃n
i=1Ei  K is possible. We denote the set of all endowment distributions by E .
Each agent i ∈ N has complete and transitive preferences Ri over 2K . The associated
strict preference relation is denoted by Pi. Moreover, preferences are strict, that is, for
all distinct subsets S, S′ ∈ 2K , either S Pi S′ or S′ Pi S. Thus, S Ri S′ means that either
S Pi S
′ or S = S′.
An important preference restriction is separability :4 agent i’s preferences are separable
whenever she prefers x to ∅ if and only if for any set S not containing x she prefers S ∪ x
to S: for all S ⊆ K and all x ∈ K \ S, x Pi ∅ ⇔ (S ∪ x) Pi S. Together with strictness
and completeness of preferences, this implies that for all S ⊆ K and all x ∈ K \ S,
∅ Pi x⇔ S Pi (S ∪ x). Let Rs be the set of separable preference relations over 2K .
A preference restriction that is often combined with separability is responsiveness:
agent i’s preferences are responsive if, for any two sets that differ only in one object, agent i
prefers the set containing the more preferred object: for all S ⊆ K and all x, y ∈ K \ S,
xPi y ⇒ (S∪x)Pi (S∪y). Roth (1985) introduces this notion of responsiveness for college
admission problems.
The last preference restriction we consider is additivity : agent i’s preferences are ad-
ditive if there exists a function ui : K → R such that for all S, S′ ∈ 2K , S Ri S′ ⇔∑
k∈S ui(k) ≥
∑
k∈S′ ui(k).
At various points, we consider the following four domains of preferences: the (other-
wise) unrestricted domain of all strict preferences Ru; the domain of separable preferences
Rs; the domain of separable and responsive preferences Rsr; and the domain of additive
preferences Ra. Clearly, Ra ( Rsr ( Rs ( Ru. Whenever we introduce notation or
concepts that apply to all preference domains, we use the generic preference domain R.
We denote a typical preference profile by R = (R1, R2, . . . , Rn) and the set of preference
profiles by RN .
Thus, given a preference profile R ∈ RN and an endowment distribution E ∈ E , we de-
note an exchange market (with indivisible objects) by (R,E). Since in the remainder of the
article we assume that the preference profile remains fixed while endowment distributions
may vary, we simply denote an exchange market by its endowment distribution E ∈ E .
An allocation for an exchange market E ∈ E is a list (S1, . . . , Sn) such that (i) each
agent i ∈ N receives some subset Si ⊆
⋃n
i=1Ei and (ii) no two agents receive the same
object: for all i, j ∈ N , Si ∩ Sj = ∅ if i 6= j. We allow for free disposal, that is,
⋃n
i=1 Si  ⋃n
i=1Ei is possible. Most of our results remain valid without free disposal (Lemma 1 is
the exception).
4For the notion of separability we use here, we refer to Barbera`, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991).
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2.2 Exchange Rules and their Properties
An (exchange) rule is a function ϕ that associates with each exchange market E ∈ E an
allocation ϕ(E) = (Si)i∈N . Given i ∈ N , we call ϕi(E) the allotment of agent i at ϕ(E).
Recall that in our model preferences are fixed. In addition, we will not consider any
properties that link exchange markets on the basis of preference profiles. Therefore rules
are only defined with respect to the given and fixed preference profile. In particular, when
introducing dictatorial rules (see Examples 2–6 and 8–11) this means that the correspond-
ing “dictatorial structure” may change across preference profiles.
Two standard requirements for rules are efficiency and individual rationality (agents
find their allotments at least as good as their endowments):
Efficiency: For all E ∈ E there is no allocation (Si)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , SiRiϕi(E),
with strict preference holding for some j ∈ N .
Individual Rationality: For all E ∈ E and all i ∈ N , ϕi(E)Ri Ei.
For all E ∈ E , we denote the set of efficient allocations by P(E), the set of individually
rational allocations by I(E), and the set of efficient and individually rational allocations
by PI(E).
Given that individual endowments are private information, an agent may manipulate
the outcome to her advantage by hiding, destroying, or transferring part of her endowment.
Given an endowment distribution E ∈ E , an agent i ∈ N , and a subset E′i ( Ei,
we obtain the new endowment distribution (E′i, E−i) where agent i hides part of her
endowment by replacing agent i’s endowment Ei with E′i.
First, we consider hiding-proofness: if agent i hides part of her endowment Ei and
pretends to only own E′i ( Ei, then she finds her original allotment ϕi(E) at least as good
as the set of objects ϕi(E′i, E−i) ∪ (Ei\E′i) she finally can consume.
Hiding-Proofness: For all E ∈ E , all i ∈ N , and all E′i ( Ei, ϕi(E) Ri [ϕi(E′i, E−i) ∪
(Ei\E′i)].
Since an agent could hide all of her endowment (E′i = ∅), we deduce the following:
Lemma 1. For any profile of separable preferences, efficiency and hiding-proofness to-
gether imply individual rationality.5
Proof: Let ϕ be efficient and hiding-proof. Let E ∈ E and i ∈ N . If ϕi(∅, E−i) = ∅, then
by hiding-proofness, ϕi(E)Ri(ϕi(∅, E−i) ∪ Ei) = Ei. If ϕi(∅, E−i) = {x1, . . . , xl−1, xl} 6= ∅,
then by efficiency, separability, strictness, and free disposal, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , l}, xk Pi ∅.
By separability, (ϕi(∅, E−i) ∪ Ei) Pi ({x1, . . . , xl−1} ∪ Ei) Pi . . . Pi (x1 ∪ Ei) Pi Ei. Hence,
by transitivity, (ϕi(∅, E−i) ∪ Ei) Pi Ei. By hiding-proofness, ϕi(E) Ri (ϕi(∅, E−i) ∪ Ei).
Thus, by transitivity, ϕi(E) Pi Ei. To summarize, for all E ∈ E and i ∈ N , ϕi(E) Ri Ei,
i.e., ϕ is individually rational. 2
If each object is desirable to each agent, that is, for all i ∈ N , and all x ∈ K, xPi∅, then
Lemma 1 holds without efficiency (that is, hiding-proofness implies individual rationality).
If each object is desirable to each agent, separability is equivalent to monotonicity, that
is, for all i ∈ N , and all S, S′ ∈ 2K , if S ! S′, then S Pi S′. In fact, “hiding-proofness
implies individual rationality” is a model-free observation if preferences are monotonic.
5Special thanks to Somdeb Lahiri for pointing out with an example that Lemma 1 is not true on Ru.
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Lemma 1 may not be valid without free disposal (e.g., any efficient and hiding-proof rule
for the free disposal setting can be easily extended to the “no-disposal” setting by assigning
undesirable objects to a predetermined agent).
Second, we consider destruction-proofness: if an agent i destroys part of her endowment
Ei, thereby reducing it to E′i ( Ei, then she finds her original allotment ϕi(E) at least as
good as her new allotment ϕi(E′i, E−i).
Destruction-Proofness: For all E ∈ E , all i ∈ N , and all E′i ( Ei, ϕi(E)Riϕi(E′i, E−i).
Given an endowment distribution E ∈ E , agents i, j ∈ N , and a subset E′i ( Ei, we
obtain the new endowment distribution (E′i, E
′
j , E−ij) where agent i transfers part of her
endowment, namely Ei\E′i, to agent j by replacing agent i’s endowment Ei with E′i and
agent j’s endowment Ej with E′j ≡ Ej ∪ Ei\E′i. We denote the exchange market that is
obtained after agent i transfers Ei\E′i to agent j by (E′i, E′j , E−ij).
Third, we consider (farsighted) transfer-proofness: if agent i transfers part of her
endowment Ei to another agent, say agent j, who is not worse off because of the transfer,
i.e., ϕj(E′i, E
′
j , E−ij)Rj ϕj(E), then agent i finds her original allotment ϕi(E) at least as
good as her new allotment ϕi(E′i, E
′
j , E−ij).
Transfer-Proofness: For all E ∈ E , all i, j ∈ N , all E′i ( Ei, and E′j ≡ Ej ∪ Ei\E′i, if
ϕj(E′i, E
′
j , E−ij)Rj ϕj(E), then ϕi(E)Ri ϕi(E
′
i, E
′
j , E−ij).
Obviously, efficiency implies transfer-proofness if n = 2. Note that we only require
that the recipient of the transfer experiences it as weakly allotment improving. We do
not require that the recipient (weakly) prefers her endowment after the transfer to her
endowment before the transfer. Hence, in the definition of transfer-proofness, we assume
transfer recipients to be farsighted. By imposing the extra condition that transfer recip-
ients experience the transfer as weakly endowment improving, we obtain the following
weaker transfer-proofness property.
Weak Transfer-Proofness: For all E ∈ E , all i, j ∈ N , all E′i ( Ei, and E′j ≡ Ej∪Ei\E′i,
if E′j Rj Ej and ϕj(E
′
i, E
′
j , E−ij)Rj ϕj(E), then ϕi(E)Ri ϕi(E
′
i, E
′
j , E−ij).
Obviously, transfer-proofness implies weak transfer-proofness. Note that if we only
impose that transfer recipients experience the transfer as weakly endowment improving,
we obtain a “myopic transfer-proofness” condition that is logically independent from our
farsighted transfer-proofness conditions. All our results remain valid if we use myopic
transfer-proofness instead of (farsighted) transfer-proofness. In the Appendix, we formally
define myopic transfer-proofness and show how examples and proofs adapt if transfer
proofness is replaced by myopic transfer-proofness.
As the following examples demonstrate, no direct relationship exists between hiding-
proofness, destruction-proofness, and (weak) transfer-proofness.
Example 1. No-Trade Rule
For any preference profile, the no-trade rule, a rule that assigns to each agent her endow-
ment, is hiding-proof and individually rational. However, even for profiles with additive
preferences, the no-trade rule may be neither destruction-proof, nor weakly transfer-proof,
nor efficient. If n = 2, then for any preference profile, the no-trade rule is transfer-proof
as well.
Since later we show that no efficient and hiding-proof rule exists, it is not possible to
find a rule that is efficient, hiding-proof, but not destruction-proof or not weakly transfer-
proof. 
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Example 2. Serial Dictatorship Rule
For any profile of separable preferences, a serial dictatorship rule, a rule that assigns
to each agent in a serial way her most preferred set of objects (among the remaining
objects), is destruction-proof, transfer-proof, and efficient. However, even for profiles with
additive preferences, a serial dictatorship rule may be neither hiding-proof, nor individually
rational.
We refer to Klaus and Miyagawa (2002) for a precise definition of serial dictatorship
rules. For unrestricted preference profiles, a serial dictatorship rule may not be destruction-
proof (e.g., destroying an object may cause a predecessor to abstain from consuming other
objects that she considers complementary to the destroyed one). 
Example 3. Conditional Serial Dictatorship Rule ϕcsd(x,E)
A conditional serial dictatorship rule ϕcsd(x,E) is defined as follows: Let x ∈ K and ϕd,
ϕd
′
be serial dictatorship rules such that for ϕd, lower-indexed agents come first and
for ϕd
′
, higher-indexed agents come first. For all E ∈ E such that x ∈ ⋃i∈N Ei, let
ϕcsd(x,E)(E) ≡ ϕd(E). For all E ∈ E such that x /∈ ⋃i∈N Ei, let ϕcsd(x,E)(E) ≡ ϕd′(E).
For any profile of separable preferences, ϕcsd(x,E) is efficient and transfer-proof. How-
ever, even for profiles with additive preferences, ϕcsd(x,E) may be neither hiding-proof, nor
individually rational, nor destruction-proof. 
Example 4. Conditional Serial Dictatorship Rule ϕcsd(x,E1)
A conditional serial dictatorship rule ϕcsd(x,E1) is defined as follows: Let x ∈ K and ϕd,
ϕd
′
be serial dictatorship rules such that for ϕd, lower-indexed agents come first and for
ϕd
′
, higher-indexed agents come first. For all E ∈ E such that x ∈ E1, let ϕcsd(x,E1)(E) ≡
ϕd(E). For all E ∈ E such that x /∈ E1, let ϕcsd(x,E1)(E) ≡ ϕd′(E).
Let n ≥ 3. Then, for any profile of separable preferences, ϕcsd(x,E1) is efficient and
destruction-proof. However, even for profiles with additive preferences, ϕcsd(x,E1) may be
neither hiding-proof, nor individually rational, nor weakly transfer-proof. If n = 2, then
for any profile of separable preferences, ϕcsd(x,E1) is transfer-proof as well. 
3 Results
3.1 Hiding-Proofness
Theorem 1. For some profiles of additive preferences, no rule is efficient and hiding-
proof.
Proof: Let ϕ be an efficient and hiding-proof rule. Let N = {1, 2}, E = (E1, E2) be such
that E1 = ab, E2 = cd, and (R1, R2) ∈ RNa have the following utility representation
u1(a) = 5, u2(a) = 6,
u1(b) = 2.1, u2(b) = 3,
u1(c) = 3, u2(c) = 1.1,
u1(d) = 4, u2(d) = 4.
Hence, by Lemma 1, ϕ is individually rational. The only efficient and individually
rational allocations are A = (ac, bd) and B = (bcd, a). Hence, ϕ(E) ∈ {A,B}.
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Case 1: ϕ(E) = A. If agent 1 hides object b, the endowment distribution becomes
E1 = (a, cd) and the only efficient and individually rational allocation for the resulting
exchange market is A1 = (cd, a). So, ϕ(E1) = A1. Hence, agent 1 consumes bcd, which she
prefers to ac, her allotment at A, in violation of hiding-proofness. Thus, ϕ(E) 6= A.
Case 2: ϕ(E) = B. If agent 2 hides object d, the endowment distribution becomes
E2 = (ab, c) and the only efficient and individually rational allocation for the resulting
exchange market is B1 = (ad, b). So, ϕ(E2) = B1. Hence, agent 2 consumes bd, which she
prefers to bc, her allotment at B, in violation of hiding-proofness. Thus, ϕ(E) 6= B.
Cases 1 and 2 together show that for n = 2, efficiency and hiding-proofness are incom-
patible. For n > 2, we simply add agents who prefer their endowments to any other set
of objects (including ∅). Since then only agents 1 and 2 trade with each other as specified
above, the incompatibility of efficiency and hiding-proofness persists for n > 2. 2
3.2 Destruction-Proofness
If we replace hiding-proofness by destruction-proofness, compatibility with efficiency and
individual rationality is possible for two agents with separable and responsive preferences.
Let N = {1, 2}, R ∈ RNsr, and E ∈ E . In order to present a rule satisfying the
properties listed above, we introduce some notation. First, for i ∈ N , we obtain E¯i by
discarding each undesirable object x, that is, an object x ∈ Ei such that ∅ Pi x. Second,
in order to preserve efficiency, we define the set E˜i by adding to E¯i all objects that agent
j 6= i discarded, and that agent i likes, that is, E˜i ≡ E¯i ∪ {x ∈ Ej\E¯j : x Pi ∅}. Note that
PI(E˜) ⊆ PI(E).
Example 5. Restricted (Serial) Dictatorship Rule6 ϕrd(i)
Let N = {1, 2} and i ∈ N . For all R ∈ RNs and all E ∈ E , ϕrd(i) picks the unique best
allocation for agent i in PI(E˜). We call agent i the restricted dictator. By construction,
ϕrd(i) is efficient and individually rational. 
Next, we show that when preferences are separable and responsive, ϕrd(i) is destruction-
proof. One can easily show that ϕrd(i) is not hiding-proof.
Proposition 1. For two agents with separable and responsive preferences, restricted dic-
tatorship rules are destruction-proof.
Proposition 1 only remains valid on Ra and Rsr, but not on Rs and Ru (see Theorem 2).
For Ru, it is easy to see that destroying an object which is considered complementary by
a previous restricted dictator, may induce this restricted dictator to choose a trade that
is more advantageously for the agent who destroyed the object.
Proof: Let N = {1, 2}, ϕ = ϕrd(1), R ∈ RNsr, and E ∈ E . Note that by definition, no
agent i can benefit by destroying an undesirable object x ∈ Ei. Hence, it is without loss of
6For n > 2 we can define restricted serial dictatorship rules ϕ˜rd(pi), where pi denotes the ordering of
“dictators.” Similarly as before, we can derive an exchange market E˜ by first letting all agents discard of
undesirable objects and then distributing them among the agents who would like to consume them (this
distribution can, for instance, be done sequentially using pi). Then, for all R ∈ RNs and E ∈ E , the first
dictator restricts the set PI(E˜) to all allocations where she receives her best allotment. Next, if several
allocations are left over, the second dictator restricts the remaining set to all allocations where she receives
her best allotment, etc.. In order to adjust restricted serial dictatorship rules if free disposal is not allowed,
we simply assume that one of the agents has to keep any object that is undesirable for all agents.
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generality to assume that E = E˜. We prove that neither agent can benefit from destroying
one of her objects. The proof that neither agent can benefit from destroying several objects
follows by applying the “one-object-argument” for each object and invoking transitivity
of preferences.
Case 1: Agent 1 destroys x ∈ E1. Let A ≡ ϕ(E) and B ≡ ϕ(E1\x,E2). Suppose B1P1A1.
By separability, (B1 ∪ x) P1 B1 and (B1 ∪ x,B2) ∈ I(E). Hence, there exists C ∈ PI(E)
such that C1R1 (B1 ∪ x). Thus, C1 P1A1, which contradicts the assumption that A is the
best allocation for agent 1 in PI(E).
Case 2: Agent 2 destroys x ∈ E2. Let A ≡ ϕ(E) and B ≡ ϕ(E1, E2\x). Suppose
B2 P2 A2. If x ∈ A2, then A2 R2 E2, which together with responsiveness implies that
A2\x R2 E2\x. Then, A ∈ PI(E) implies (A1, A2\x) ∈ PI(E1, E2\x). Thus, by the
definition of ϕ, B1 R1 A1. This and B2 P2 A2 contradict that A ∈ P(E). Hence, x ∈ A1.
Since A ∈ P(E), A1 P1 (B1 ∪ x). By responsiveness, A1\x P1 B1. Note that (A1\x,A2) ∈
I(E1, E2\x). Hence, there exists C ∈ PI(E1, E2\x) such that C1P1B1, which contradicts
the assumption that B is the best allocation for agent 1 in PI(E1, E2\x). 2
The following example describes a class of rules that are all efficient, individually
rational, and destruction-proof.
Example 6. Restricted Conditional Dictatorship Rule ϕrcd(K
′,E¯1)
Let N = {1, 2} and K ′ ⊆ K. For all R ∈ RNsr and all E ∈ E such that K ′ ⊆ E¯1,
ϕrcd(K
′,E¯1)(E) ≡ ϕrd(1)(E). For all R ∈ RNsr and all E ∈ E such that K ′ * E¯1,
ϕrcd(K
′,E¯1)(E) ≡ ϕrd(2)(E). Then, ϕrcd(K′,E¯1) is efficient, individually rational, and
destruction-proof. 
Many other restricted conditional dictatorship rules that are destruction-proof and
are similar to those in Example 6 can be constructed. For instance, one can condition
the choice of the restricted dictator differently, e.g., by K ′ ∩ E¯1 6= ∅ instead of K ′ ⊆ E¯1.
Hence, the class of rules that are efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof for
two agents with separable and responsive preferences is very large.
The next example demonstrates that for more than two agents, a restricted serial
dictatorship rule may be manipulable by destruction. This result holds for any subdomain
of Rs that includes the domain of additive preferences Ra, in particular, for Ra, Rsr,
and Rs (recall that our definition of a restricted serial dictatorship rules only applies to
separable preferences so that we cannot make any statements about Ru).
Example 7. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, E = (E1, E2, E3) be such that E1 = a, E2 = bc, E3 = de,
and (R1, R2, R3) ∈ RNa have the following utility representation
u1(a) = 1, u2(a) = 5, u3(a) = 7,
u1(b) = 8, u2(b) = 4, u3(b) = 6,
u1(c) = 5, u2(c) = 2, u3(c) = 1.1,
u1(d) = 10.5, u2(d) = 8, u3(d) = 3,
u1(e) = 0.1, u2(e) = 1.5, u3(e) = 2.3.
If agent 1 is the restricted dictator, then the restricted serial dictatorship rule picks
(cd, ae, b). However, if agent 3 destroys object e, for the resulting exchange market, the
restricted serial dictatorship rule picks (bc, d, a). Hence, agent 3 consumes a, which she
strictly prefers to b, in violation of destruction-proofness. 
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It is an open question whether for more than two agents with additive, or separable and
responsive preferences, efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist.
If preferences are “only” separable, then we can establish the incompatibility of efficiency,
individual rationality, and destruction-proofness for any number of agents.
Theorem 2. For some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually
rational, and destruction-proof.
Proof: Let ϕ be an efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rule. Let N =
{1, 2}, E = (E1, E2) be such that E1 = ab, E2 = cde, and (R1, R2) ∈ RNs be as in Table 1.
The underline symbol ‘ ’ in each allotment indicates that the corresponding object is not
in the allotment. This presentation makes it easier to verify that both preference relations
are separable. In order to save space, each linear ordering is listed in two columns. Once
the reader reaches the bottom of the first column, she should continue from the top of the
second column. The important entries are marked in boldface and the endowments are
underlined.7
R1 R2
a b c d e b c e a b c d e a b
a b c d b d e a b c d a c
a b c e a d a b c e a d
a b d e a e a b d e a e
a c d e a a c d e a
b c d e b c b c d e c d e
c d e b d a b c b c
a b c b e a b d b e
a b d c d a b e c d
a b e c e a c d c e
a c d d e a c e d e
a c e b a d e b
a c c b c d c
a b d b c e d
a d e e b d e e
b c d b d
Table 1: Complete separable preferences in the proof of Theorem 2.
We now explain how one can reduce the preference table to allotments that can occur
at efficient and individually rational allocations. First, by individual rationality, for each
agent, we can delete all allotments that are ranked below her endowment. Next, by
individual rationality, agent 1 has to receive at least two objects and, agent 2 has to
receive a or at least two objects. Hence, we can delete all allotments containing more than
three objects, except bcde for agent 1. Finally, at any efficient allocation all objects must
be assigned. Thus, we can delete allotments from an agent’s preference relation if the
remaining objects are not individually rational for the other agent. For example, since bc
7Note that the ranking of boldfaced entries in Table 1 contains the information on preferences we use
in the proof. We then constructed Table 1 as a separable extension of these preferences.
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is not individually rational for agent 1, agent 2 will never receive ade and we can delete
the associated entry in Table 1. Hence, by efficiency and individual rationality, we can
focus on the part of the preferences depicted in Table 2.
R1 R2
b c d e b d e
c d e b d
a c e a b
a c a
a b c d e
Table 2: Relevant entries in Table 1 after taking efficiency and individual rationality into
account.
Note that E is not efficient. Hence, according to Table 2, the only efficient and individu-
ally rational allocations are A = (bcde, a), B = (cde, ab), C = (ace, bd), and D = (ac, bde).
Hence, ϕ(E) ∈ {A,B,C,D}.
Case 1: ϕ(E) ∈ {A,B}. If agent 2 destroys object e, the endowment distribution becomes
E1 = (ab, cd). It is easy to check that the only efficient and individually rational allocation
for the resulting exchange market is A1 = (ac, bd). So, ϕ(E1) = A1. Hence, agent 2
consumes bd, which she prefers to a, her allotment at A; and to ab, her allotment at B, in
violation of destruction-proofness. Thus, ϕ(E) /∈ {A,B}.
Case 2: ϕ(E) ∈ {C,D}. If agent 1 destroys object b, the endowment distribution becomes
E2 = (a, cde). It is easy to check that the only efficient and individually rational allocation
for the resulting exchange market is C1 = (cde, a). So, ϕ(E2) = C1. Hence, agent 1
consumes cde, which she prefers to ace, her allotment at C; and to ac, her allotment at
D, in violation of destruction-proofness. Thus, ϕ(E) /∈ {C,D}.
Cases 1 and 2 together show that for n = 2, efficiency, individual rationality, and
destruction-proofness are incompatible. For n > 2, we simply add agents who prefer
their endowments to any other set of objects (including ∅). Since then only agents 1 and
2 trade with each other as specified above, the incompatibility of efficiency, individual
rationality, and destruction-proofness persists for n > 2. 2
3.3 Transfer-Proofness
For two agents, efficiency implies transfer-proofness. Hence, when n = 2, for any prefer-
ence profile, any efficient and individually rational rule is transfer-proofness.
It is an open question whether for more than two agents with either additive, or
separable and responsive preferences, efficient, individually rational, and weakly transfer-
proof rules exist. However, for more than two agents with separable preferences, these
properties are not compatible.
Theorem 3. For some profiles of separable preferences and at least three agents, no rule
is efficient, individually rational, and weakly transfer-proof.
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Proof: Let ϕ be an efficient, individually rational, and transfer-proof rule. Let N =
{1, 2, 3}, E = (E1, E2, E3) be such that E1 = ab, E2 = cd, E3 = ef , and (R1, R2, R3) ∈ RNs
be as in Table 3 (the structure is as in Table 1). The important entries are marked in bold
face and the endowments are underlined.8
R1 R2 R3
a b c d e f c e f a b c d e f a e f a b c d e f b d e f
a b c d f e f a b c d f a e a b c d e a e f
a b d e f a b c d a b c e f b c d e a b c d f b e f
a c d e f a b c f a b d e f c d e f a c d e f d e f
b c d e f a b c b c d e f b c d b c d e f e f
a b d f a b d a b c f c d e a b c d a b d f
a c d f a b f a b d f c d f a c d e a b f
a d e f a b a b e f c d a c d f a d f
b c d f b c d b c d f a d f b c d e b d f
b d e f b c e b c e f b d e b c d f a f
c d e f b c f b d e f d e f c d e f b f
a d f b c a b f a d a c d c f
b d f b d b c f b d b c d d f
c d f b e b d f d e c d e f
d e f b f b e f d f c d f a b d e
d f b b f d c d a b d
a b c d e a c d a b c d e a c f a b c e f a b e
a b c e f a c e a c d e f b c e a c e f a d e
a b c e a c f a b c d c e f b c e f b d e
a b d e a c a c d e a c c e f a b
a b e f a d a c d f a f a b c e a d
a b e a e a c d b c a b c f a e
a c d e a f a b c e b e a b c b d
b c d e c d a b d e c e b c e b e
a d e c e a b c c f b c f c e
b d e c f a b d e f b c d e
c d e a a b e a a c e a
d e c a b b a c f b
a c e f d a c e f c a c c
b c e f e a d e f e a b d e f d
a e f f a c e f a b e f e
b e f a d e a d e f
Table 3: Complete separable preferences in the proof of Theorem 3.
We now explain how one can reduce the preference table to allotments that can occur
at efficient and individually rational allocations. First, by individual rationality, for each
agent, we can delete all allotments that are ranked below her endowment. All individually
8Note that the ranking of boldfaced entries in Table 3 contains the information on preferences we use
in the proof. We then constructed Table 3 as a separable extension of these preferences.
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rational allotments that are left contain at least two objects for each agent. Hence, we can
delete all allotments containing more than two objects. Thus, by individual rationality,
we can focus on the part of the preferences depicted in Table 4.
R1 R2 R3
d f b f c d
d e a b b c
e f a e a c
a b c d e f
Table 4: Relevant entries in Table 3 after taking individual rationality into account.
Note that E is not efficient. Hence, according to Table 4, the only efficient and in-
dividually rational allocations are A = (df, ae, bc), B = (de, bf, ac), and C = (ef, ab, cd).
Hence, ϕ(E) ∈ {A,B,C}.
Case 1: ϕ(E) = A. If agent 2 transfers object c to agent 3, the endowment distribution
becomes E1 = (ab, d, cef). We now explain how one can reduce the preference table to
allotments that can occur at efficient and individually rational allocations for exchange
market E1. First, by individual rationality, for each agent, we can delete all allotments
that are ranked below her endowment. Next, by individual rationality, agent 1 has to
receive at least two objects; agent 2 has to keep her endowment or receive at least two
objects, and agent 3 has to receive cd or at least three objects. Thus, agent 1 can receive
three objects only if none of them are c or d, and agent 2 can receive two objects only if
none of them are c or d. Hence, by individual rationality, we can focus on the part of the
preferences depicted in Table 5.
R1 R2 R3
d f b f a c d
a b e a b b c d
d e a e c d e
a e f d c d f
b e f c d
e f c e f
a b f
a b
Table 5: Case 1, relevant entries in Table 3 after taking individual rationality into account.
Note that E1 is not efficient. Hence, according to Table 5, the only efficient and
individually rational allocation for the resulting exchange market is C = (ef, ab, cd). So,
ϕ(E1) = C. Hence, agent 2 consumes ab, which she prefers to ae, her allotment at A, in
violation of transfer-proofness. Since agent 3 receives cd, which she prefers to bc, we also
have a contradiction to weak transfer-proofness. Thus, ϕ(E) 6= A.
Case 2: ϕ(E) = B. If agent 3 transfers object e to agent 1, the endowment distribution
becomes E2 = (abe, cd, f). Using similar arguments as in Case 1, we can focus on the part
of the preferences depicted in Table 6.
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R1 R2 R3
a d f b f b c
b d f a b c a c
c d f a b e f
d e f a b
d f a c e
a b e a e
c d
Table 6: Case 2, relevant entries in Table 3 after taking individual rationality into account.
Note that E2 is not efficient. Hence, according to Table 6, the only efficient and
individually rational allocation for the resulting exchange market is A = (df, ae, bc). So,
ϕ(E2) = A. Hence, agent 3 consumes bc, which she prefers to ac, her allotment at B, in
violation of transfer-proofness. Since agent 1 receives df , which she prefers to de, we also
have a contradiction to weak transfer-proofness. Thus, ϕ(E) 6= B.
Case 3: ϕ(E) = C. If agent 1 transfers object a to agent 2, the endowment distribution
becomes E3 = (b, acd, ef). Using similar arguments as in Case 1, we can focus on the part
of the preferences depicted in Table 7.
R1 R2 R3
d e a b f a c d
b b c f c d e
b d f c d
b e f b c
b f a c e
a c d a c
e f
Table 7: Case 3, relevant entries in Table 3 after taking individual rationality into account.
Note that E3 is not efficient. Hence, according to Table 7, the only efficient and
individually rational allocation for the resulting exchange market is B = (de, bf, ac). So,
ϕ(E3) = B. Hence, agent 1 consumes de, which she prefers to ef , her allotment at C, in
violation of transfer-proofness. Since agent 2 receives bf , which she prefers to ab, we also
have a contradiction to weak transfer-proofness. Thus, ϕ(E) 6= C.
Cases 1, 2, and 3 together show that efficiency, individual rationality, and weak transfer-
proofness are incompatible for three agents. For n > 3, we simply add agents who prefer
their endowments to any other set of objects (including ∅). Since then, only agents 1, 2,
and 3 trade with each other as specified above, the incompatibility of efficiency, individual
rationality, and weak transfer-proofness persists for n > 3. 2
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that for separable preferences, efficient and individually rational
rules are generally not immune to manipulations via endowments (Theorems 1, 2, and
3). An exception is the compatibility of efficiency, individual rationality and transfer-
proofness in the two-agent case (efficiency then implies transfer-proofness). If in addition
to separability we impose responsiveness, we obtain compatibility of efficiency, individual
rationality, and destruction-proofness in the two-agent case (Proposition 1). We conjec-
ture that the “dividing line” between compatibility and incompatibility lies between the
preference domains Rsr and Rs. However, two interesting questions we could not answer
are:
Are efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness compatible for more
than two agents with separable and responsive (additive) preferences?
Are efficiency, individual rationality, and (weak) transfer-proofness compatible for
more than two agents with separable and responsive (additive) preferences?
A reason why it is not easy to answer these questions is that as the numbers of agents
and objects become larger, it gets more difficult to determine the set of efficient and
individually rational allocations.
Appendix: Myopic Transfer-Proofness
As an alternative transfer-proofness condition we now consider myopic transfer-proofness:
if agent i transfers part of her endowment Ei to another agent, say agent j, who experiences
the transfer as weakly endowment improving, thereby reducing her endowment to E′i ( Ei,
and expanding agent j’s endowment to E′j ) Ej such that E′j Rj Ej , then agent i finds
her original allotment ϕi(E) at least as good as her new allotment ϕi(E′i, E
′
j , E−ij).
Myopic Transfer-Proofness: For all E ∈ E , all i, j ∈ N , all E′i ( Ei, and E′j ≡
Ej ∪ Ei\E′i, if E′j Rj Ej , then ϕi(E)Ri ϕi(E′i, E′j , E−ij).
Obviously, myopic transfer-proofness implies weak transfer-proofness. Furthermore,
the serial dictatorship rules and conditional serial dictatorship rules ϕcsd(x,E) are myopic
transfer-proof (see Examples 2 and 3). Clearly, the no-trade rule and the conditional serial
dictatorship rules ϕcsd(x,E1) are not myopic transfer-proof (see Examples 1 and 4). Hence,
myopic transfer-proofness is logically independent of hiding-proofness and destruction-
proofness.
Next, we consider the independence of myopic transfer-proofness and transfer-
proofness. There are two cases of underlying separable preference profiles where myopic
transfer-proofness and transfer-proofness are not logically independent.
The first case is when no object is desirable, i.e., for all x ∈ K and all i ∈ N , ∅Pi x. In
this case, any rule is myopic transfer-proof by definition and therefore transfer-proofness
trivially implies myopic transfer-proofness.
The following rule shows that if a desirable object exists, then transfer-proofness does
not necessarily imply myopic transfer-proofness. Without loss of generality, let x+ be a
“desirable object” for agent 1, i.e., x+ P1 ∅.
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Example 8. Conditional Serial Dictatorship Rule ϕcsd(x
+,E1,{1,2})
A conditional serial dictatorship rule ϕcsd(x
+,E1,{1,2}) is defined as follows: Let x+ ∈ K be
such that x+ P1 ∅, and ϕd, ϕd′ be serial dictatorship rules such that for ϕd, lower-indexed
agents come first and for ϕd
′
, the order of agents 1 and 2 is switched and for the rest, lower-
indexed agents come first. For all E ∈ E such that x+ ∈ E1, let ϕcsd(x+,E1,{1,2})(E) ≡
ϕd
′
(E). For all E ∈ E such that x+ /∈ E1, let ϕcsd(x+,E1,{1,2})(E) ≡ ϕd(E). On Ra,
Rsr, and Rs, ϕcsd(x+,E1,{1,2}) is efficient and transfer-proof, but not myopic transfer-proof
(agent 2 may benefit from transferring object x+ to agent 1). 
The second case when transfer-proofness and myopic transfer-proofness are not logi-
cally independent occurs when all objects are desirable, i.e., for all x ∈ K and all i ∈ N ,
x Pi ∅. In this case, all transfers are weakly endowment improving for the recipient and
therefore myopic transfer-proofness implies transfer-proofness.
The following rule shows that if an undesirable object exists, then myopic transfer-
proofness does not necessarily imply transfer-proofness. Without loss of generality, let x−
be an “undesirable object” for agent 1, i.e., ∅ P1 x−.
Example 9. Conditional Serial Dictatorship Rule ϕcsd(x
−,E1,{1,2})
A conditional serial dictatorship rule ϕcsd(x
−,E1,{1,2}) is defined as follows: Let x− ∈ K
be such that ∅ P1 x−, and ϕd, ϕd′ be serial dictatorship rules such that for ϕd, lower-
indexed agents come first, and for ϕd
′
, starting with agent 3 lower-indexed agents come
first and then agents 1 and 2 come at the end of this order. For all E ∈ E such that
x− ∈ E1, let ϕcsd(x−,E1,{1,2})(E) ≡ ϕd(E). For all E ∈ E such that x− /∈ E1, let
ϕcsd(x
−,E1,{1,2})(E) ≡ ϕd′(E). Let n ≥ 3. Then, for any separable preference profile,
ϕcsd(x
−,E1,{1,2}) is efficient and myopic transfer-proof. However, even for profiles with ad-
ditive preferences, ϕcsd(x
−,E1,{1,2}) may not be transfer-proof (agents 1 and 2 both may
benefit if agent 2 transfers object x− to agent 1). If n = 2, then for any separable preference
profile, ϕcsd(x
−,E1,{1,2}) is transfer-proof as well. 
All our results remain valid if we use myopic transfer-proofness instead of (farsighted)
transfer-proofness. Even though efficiency does not imply myopic transfer-proofness when
n = 2, we can still establish the compatibility of myopic transfer-proofness with efficiency
and individual rationality for two agents. In fact, restricted serial dictatorship rules (de-
fined in Section 3.2 on the domain of separable preferences in Example 5 and Footnote 5)
are myopic transfer-proof.
We extend the definition of restricted (serial) dictatorship rules to the domain of un-
restricted preferences Ru. Let N = {1, 2}, R ∈ RNu , and E ∈ E . For all j ∈ N , let E¯j be
the most preferred subset of Ej for agent j, that is, for all S ⊆ Ej , E¯j Rj S.
Example 10. Restricted (Serial) Dictatorship Rule ϕrd(i)
Let N = {1, 2} and i ∈ N . For all R ∈ RNu and all E ∈ E , ϕrd(i) picks the unique best
allocation for agent i in PI(E) that is individually rational for agent j 6= i with respect to
E¯j , that is, ϕ
rd(i)
j (E) Rj E¯j . By construction, ϕ
rd(i) is efficient and individually rational.
Next, we show that ϕrd(i) is myopic transfer-proof.
Proposition 2. For two agents with unrestricted preferences, restricted dictatorship rules
are myopic transfer-proof.
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Proposition 2 remains valid on Ra, Rsr, Rs, and Ru.
Proof: Let N = {1, 2}, ϕ = ϕrd(1), R ∈ RNu , and E ∈ E . We prove that neither agent
can benefit from transferring one of her objects to the other agent. The proof that neither
agent can benefit from transferring several objects follows by applying the “one-object-
argument” for each object and invoking transitivity of preferences.
Case 1: Agent 1 transfers x ∈ E1 to agent 2. Let E′2 ≡ (E2∪x)R2E2. Let A ≡ ϕ(E) and
B ≡ ϕ(E1\x,E′2). Suppose B1 P1 A1. Since E¯ ∈ I(E), by the definition of ϕ, A1 R1 E¯1.
By individual rationality, B2R2 E¯′2R2E′2. Note also that E¯′2R2 E¯2. Then, by transitivity,
B1 P1 E¯1 and B2R2 E¯2. Hence, there exists C ∈ PI(E) such that C1R1B1 and C2R2B2.
Thus, C1P1A1 and C2R2E¯2, which contradicts the assumption that A is the best allocation
for agent 1 in PI(E).
Case 2: Agent 2 transfers x ∈ E2 to agent 1. Let (E1 ∪ x) R1 E1 and E′2 ≡ E2\x. Let
A ≡ ϕ(E) and B ≡ ϕ(E1 ∪ x,E′2). Suppose B2 P2 A2. Then, by efficiency, A1 P1 B1. By
individual rationality, B1R1(E1∪x). By the definition of ϕr, A2R2E¯2. Note that E¯2R2E¯′2.
Then, by transitivity, A1P1 (E1∪x) and A2R2 E¯′2. Hence, there exists C ∈ PI(E1∪x,E′2)
such that C1 R1 A1 and C2 R2 A2. Thus, C1 P1 B1 and C2 R2 E¯′2, which contradicts the
assumption that B is the best allocation for agent 1 in PI(E1 ∪ x,E′2). 2
The following example describes a class of rules that are all efficient, individually
rational, and myopic transfer-proof.
Example 11. Restricted Conditional Dictatorship Rule ϕrcd(x,E˜)
Let N = {1, 2} and x ∈ K. For all R ∈ RNsr and all E ∈ E such that x ∈
⋃
i∈N E˜i,
ϕrcd(x,E˜)(E) = ϕrd(1)(E). For all R ∈ RNsr and all E ∈ E such that x /∈
⋃
i∈N E˜i,
ϕrcd(x,E˜)(E) = ϕrd(2)(E). Then, ϕrcd(x,E˜) is efficient, individually rational, and myopic
transfer-proof. 
Many other restricted conditional dictatorship rules that aremyopic transfer-proof and
are similar to those in Example 11 can be constructed. For instance, one can condition
the choice of the restricted dictator differently on the set of collectively owned objects,
e.g., by K ′ ∩ ⋃i∈N E˜i 6= ∅ instead of x ∈ ⋃i∈N E˜i. Hence, the class of rules that are
efficient, individually rational, and myopic transfer-proof for two agents with separable
and responsive preferences is very large.
The next example demonstrates that for more than two agents, a restricted serial
dictatorship rule may be manipulable by transfers. This result holds for any subdomain
of Ru that includes the domain of additive preferences Ra, in particular, for Ra, Rsr, Rs,
and Ru.
Example 12. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, E = (E1, E2, E3) be such that E1 = a, E2 = bc, E3 = de,
and (R1, R2, R3) ∈ RNa be the same as in Example 7.
If agent 1 is the restricted dictator, then the restricted serial dictatorship rule picks
(cd, ae, b). However, if agent 3 transfers object e to agent 2, for the resulting exchange
market the restricted serial dictatorship rule picks (bce, d, a). Hence, agent 3 consumes a,
which she prefers to b, in violation of myopic transfer-proofness. Since agent 2 receives d,
which she prefers to ae, we also have a contradiction to weak transfer-proofness. 
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